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Sniping Bargains: Late Bidding on Pairs of eBay Auctions 
 
I. Background Information 
 
Internet auctions have resulted in much data that may shed light on buying and selling behavior.  
Furthermore, they have allowed for field experiments to explore these phenomena with more 
control and with greater depth.  Finally, they have revealed new behavioral patterns worthy of 
exploration.  One of these behaviors is late bidding, or sniping, which occurs when people place 
bids close to the auction’s close to supposedly have a greater chance of winning at a lower price.  
This study investigated the monetary benefit a user may gain by delaying the decision of which 
auction to bid on until the last two minutes. It reviewed past data on DVD auctions to examine 
this effect.   
 
There has been much work done on eBay auctions in the past.  eBay auctions use a proxy 
bidding system.  Each bidder submits the maximum amount they are willing to pay for an item 
and the system automatically adjusts the appropriate increments whenever new bidders challenge 
the current price.  Before proceeding, it will be useful to review some of the relevant literature 
describing buyer behavior on eBay. 
 
Multiple Bidding (Ockenfels and Roth 2006) 
 
Ockenfels and Roth, along with other researchers, have explored the phenomenon of multiple 
bidding.  Instead of bidding once, many eBayers bid incrementally, placing multiple bids on the 
same auction.  This is worthy to note, although this study is concerned with late bidding. 
 
Late Bidding (Adapted Mostly from Bajari and Hortaçsu 2004) 
 
Research has proven that late bidding is a common behavior (Bajari 462).  Theoretically, late 
bidding should not be optimal because of eBay’s proxy bidding system, which allows bidders to 
submit a private maximum reservation price for the item and subsequently places bids against 
competitors as they arrive.  In 1961, William Vickrey observed that, in a second-price sealed-bid 
auction, bidding ones actual reservation price is a weakly dominant strategy because it has a 
larger chance of winning and the payoff is based on the second-highest bid, so there is no risk of 
being forced into a higher price (462).  However, eBay data reveals late bidding behavior is still 
occurring.  The question is why. 
 
Ely and Hossain demonstrated that sniping produces a benefit, albeit a small one, by bidding on 
auctions for 20 different newly-released DVDs using 4 different valuation levels. (Ely and 
Hossain 2006) 
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Kamins et. al. conducted a field experiment investigating the value of sniping.  It involved 
picking identical items (literally identical descriptions by identical sellers) for 190 coin auctions.  
They bid at different times, early or sniping, at the median price for previous auctions (averaging 
$10.50).  They find no benefit to sniping but this is limited to these cheap coin lots, which may 
not be the best product to examine.  Additionally, they only placed their bids at the median price.  
The benefit to sniping could stem from placing lower bids and winning at a higher frequency 
(Kamins et. al. 2006). 
 
Gray and Reiley bid on 70 pairs of identical items from the same seller ending at the same time.  
These items included Playstation 2 games, DVDs, coin proof sets, Xbox games, die cast Hot 
Wheels cars, and Game Boy Advance games.  They found a 2.54% price benefit to sniping, 
which was not statistically significant.  This experiment seems very limited, since they only 
chose pairs of items from the same seller which means their sample was limited to sellers selling 
identical items at the same time.  They also deliberately bid high enough to win every auction, 
relying on high values such as book values from pricing guides or the actual price of a new DVD 
in Walmart, in order to make their bids (Gray and Reiley 2004). 
 
Ockenfels and Roth compared eBay auctions for computers and antiques with Amazon.com 
auctions for the same items (2003).  They did so because Amazon.com auctions have a different 
ending rule which extends the length of the auction for ten minutes past the last bid, possibly 
removing a benefit from last-minute bidding.  Ockenfels and Roth theorized that late bidding is a 
form of tacit collusion amongst bidders to attempt to have softer competition.  While late bidding 
creates an inherent risk that the bid may not be transmitted, this risk implies cheaper prices to 
those bidders whose bids get submitted.  Ockenfels and Roth’s study revealed that last-minute 
bidding was much more prevalent on eBay than Amazon (and almost nonexistent on Amazon), 
suggesting that the idea of prohibiting competition is a huge factor driving this behavior.  
However other studies comparing hard endings with flexible endings do not produce the same 
results (Bajari 462-463).   
 
Hasker, Gonzalez, and Sickles attempted to replicate the study to evaluate tacit collusion.  They 
examined bids for computer monitors on eBay, reasoning that the winning price distributions 
from late bids should be more favorable to buyers than the distributions from early bids.  They 
could not prove an inequality between these two distributions, contributing to additional 
evidence against the tacit collusion theory (Bajari 463).  Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) also 
examined a data set of eBay coin auctions and found that, based on regressions, early bidding is 
not correlated with increased final sales prices (463). 
 
An alternative explanation to tacit collusion, also put forth by Ockenfels and Roth (2003), is 
bidder naïveté.  The argument is that newer bidders make incremental bids in response to 
competitors because of a limited understanding of the proxy-bidding mechanism, so experienced 
bidders wait until the end in the hopes of limiting their bidding and securing a lower price.  
Ockenfels and Roth presented empirical evidence demonstrating that experienced bidders are 
less likely to make multiple bids.  This research is bolstered by a controlled laboratory 
experiment understaken by Ariely, Ockenfels, and Roth (463), in which they conducted an eBay-
type fixed-deadline auction with no probability of losing a bid in transmission.  This should 
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remove the benefits of tacit collusion, but there was still last minute bidding because it is a good 
response to naïve bidders.  
 
Another explanation put forth in the research is that bidders hold private information about the 
item’s true value, and by bidding early they signal this information to other bidders and increase 
the final price.  Studies on eBay reveal that this factor could be encouraging late bidding.  One 
study finds last minute bidding to be more prevalent in antiques auctions than in computer 
auctions, which makes sense based on this theory because antiques may contain more of this 
hidden information than commodities like computers (Bajari 463-464). 
 
Wang suggests that multiple auctions available for the same item contribute to last minute 
bidding (Wang 2003).  Wang makes note of the fact that multiple auctions for the same item 
affect bidding behavior, so auctions should not be viewed as independent events.  He suggests 
that even though last minute bidding is produced by multiple auctions, there still is no real 
benefit to sniping because the final prices end up being the same.   
 
One other possible reason for late bidding is that bidders may not know their personal valuation 
of an item and, rather than search for it and incur added research costs, they simply wait until the 
end of the auction to make a decision (Bajari 464).   
 
Alternatively, a seemingly unexamined area that may contribute to late bidding is the real cost of 
lock-in.  By bidding early on an auction, a bidder is committing themselves to the auction and 
they must wait until they are outbid before pursuing another item.  If this is a seven day auction, 
and they are outbid in the final minutes, the bidder has lost 7 days during which time they could 
have purchased an alternative item were they not locked into this auction.  There is thus an 
economic value to being free to pursue other items instead of being locked into this uncertain 
contract. 
 
Product Variation in Last Minute Bidding 
 
The benefits from last minute bidding may vary from product to product.  Schindler found that 
sellers use automatic extensions more often for art and cars, but not for computers, implying that 
the first two products might fuel more tacit collusion (Bajari 463).  Other research has also 
demonstrated that the amount of late bidding and multiple bidding vary across different products 
(Borle et. al. 2006). 
 
Forward Looking Bidding (adapted from Zeithammer 2006) 
 
Robert Zeithammer has proposed a new model of equilibrium bidding assuming that the bidder 
knows the item will be available in future auctions.  Rather than view the auction as an isolated 
event, many consumers bid on items such as DVDs in which the same item will be offered again 
soon after.  The bidder is faced with a choice of winning now at a higher price but thereby 
sacrificing future surpluses that could be gained from bidding later.  Assuming the bidder knows 
that there will be more auctions on the horizon, he should revise his bids downward with the 
hope of attaining this surplus.  Zeithammer’s model explores three scenarios in which bidders 
use different amounts of information: 
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1. Bidders do not pay attention to any future information at all. 
2. Bidders only look at the frequency of future auctions available (eBay shows auctions for 
similar items ending soon).  These bidders reduce their bids more when there are more 
auctions ending soon because they see the other opportunities. 
3. Bidders can examine the near auctions in more depth to explore if the attributes of the 
product meet their needs.  They will revise their bids downward if there are more 
desirable items coming up. 
 
To test his theory, Zeithammer investigated different mp3 player brands and different DVD 
movies as different product types.  His findings supported this model over a simpler one that 
ignored sequential auctions. 
 
Zeithammer’s work suggests that it is important to review other auctions when examining 
demand side strategies on eBay. 
 
Anwar, McMillan, and Zheng conducted a study by examining eBay data for CPUs over a four 
month period and found that bidders do exhibit a cross-bidding strategy and when they do this 
leads to a lower price (Anwar et. al. 2006). 
 
2. Introduction to this Study 
 
This study will continue to look at auctions as a sequential set of opportunities as opposed to 
independent events.  However, it combines these two approaches – late bidding and sequential 
auction strategies – to see if choosing between auctions leads to an economic benefit to sniping. 
 
Research Worthy of Note in Designing Our Experiment 
 
In designing the experiment, it is important to pay attention to total price.  The total price paid 
includes sales price and shipping.  Research has shown buyers tend to pay higher total prices if 
there is a lower ending sales price, possibly because of processing the two components in 
different mental accounts (Hossain and Morgan 2006).  While the dataset on shipping prices was 
incomplete and the taxes are idiosyncratically administered, the experiment was run including 
and excluding what shipping prices were included in the data in order to see if there was an 
effect.  Regressions were run with independent variables of whether or not the shipping or tax 
was included in order to ensure there were no significant differences in the results because of 
these variables. 
 
Other important factors to note and control for in the experiment include seller feedback rating 
(much research has been done regarding its impact on auctions) and closing time of the auctions.  
Controls were included for these factors as well. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
This study analyzed a comprehensive dataset of DVD auctions on eBay which ended in October 
of 2002.  This data includes each bidder’s proxy bids (it lists the highest amount they are willing 
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to pay, which is more than the item actually sold for in most cases).  Pairs of auctions were 
chosen ending within 120 minutes of one another, assuming that buyers would choose between 
two auctions for the same DVD title.  Within each pair, the price of the items 2 minutes before 
its end and the price 2 days before its end were noted, and the best deal was chosen in each 
scenario.  
 
The proxy bid of the highest bidder (or the starting price if there was no highest bidder) was 
examined along with the auctions’ bidding increment and shipping prices to determine: 
 
1) How much a theoretical extra bidder would have to pay to win this auction. 
2) If the theoretical bidder would bid if he held out for the 25th percentile or less (the 
individual price distributions for each movie title were used to compute these 
percentiles). 
 
For each item pair, these choices were made at both the early and late times, and the amount paid 
was recorded.  Moreover, whether the amount paid was in the 25th percentile or less was also 
recorded.  Then, the differences in these amounts across the early and late condition were 
examined. 
 
It was hypothesized that there would be statistically significant benefits to bidding late because 
the prices at that time more accurately reflect the final price, allowing the bidder to choose a 
better bargain. 
 
The Data Set 
This data set was furnished by eBay, and originally provided to Uri Simonsohn.  It includes 
35,888 different bids on 8,086 different items selling 54 different DVD titles.  The data includes 
a wide variety of variables for each discrete bid.  The relevant features for this study include: 
 
• Item ID 
• Movie title 
• Used or new? 
• Start price 
• Proxy bid amount 
• Bid increment 
• Actual price at time of bid 
• Start and end date and time 
• Shipping price, when available 
• Seller feedback rating 
• Sold in eBay store or not? 
• Shipping price included or not? 
• Need to pay tax or not? 
 
The Sorting Algorithm to Select Auction Pairs 
The time each auction ended was standardized to the amount of minutes until November 30, 
2002 at 11:59 PM.  This data was then sorted first by movie, then by when the auction ended. 
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A sorting algorithm was developed to search for sets (thanks to much help from Vijay 
Nagappan).  The difference between the end time of the auctions was examined to ensure that 
they ended within 120 minutes of each other.  If more than one item could fit in the 120 minute 
span, the algorithm used a random number generator to decide which items became sets.  The 
algorithm performed multiple sweeps and it paired remaining items into sets as well, even 
though they were more than 120 minutes apart.  These extraneous sets were then removed. 
 
4,238 items were placed in 2,119 pairs ending within 120 minutes of one another.  542 of the 
pairs were of two used items, 728 pairs were a mix of new and used items, and 849 pairs were of 
two new items. 
 
More descriptive data was generated on the sets including: 
 
• Unique set ID linked to both items in each pair 
• Difference in time between when the two items end 
• Difference in seller feedback fating 
• Difference in seller feedback rating / average of the two ratings (to standardize) 
• Set type - whether the set was both used, both new, or mixed 
 
The Lookup Table 
The items in each set were compared to one another.  A table was developed to search for the 
price at any time.  Algorithms were developed to find the price for each item at 2 minutes and 
2880 minutes (2 days).  Whichever item had a cheaper price was the “choice” made at that time. 
 
Once this choice was made, the proxy bid of the highest bidder on the item was combined with 
the increment (and in some cases the shipping price) to determine the amount one would have to 
pay to win the auction.  That amount was recorded as an absolute value of price paid in each 
scenario.   
 
The early condition was subtracted from the late condition in all of the analyses of differences 
between the scenarios.  It was hypothesized that the results would be negative, indicating that the 
late condition was a better buy.  Two effects, a price and a frequency effect, were examined 
using the amounts paid for the equivalent early and late scenarios. 
 
A. Price Effect – The difference between the price paid in the early and late scenarios was 
examined as an absolute value. 
B. Frequency Effect – If the amount to win was less than or equal to the 25th percentile value 
for that movie, it was recorded that the bidder would win this item at a bargain price.  
Then the frequency of winning across the early and late scenarios was compared. 
 
There were some complications with the data.  Bids which did not include the minutes until the 
end of the auction were excluded from the pricing table.  This totaled 9,884, or 27.54%, of the 
35,888 bids.   
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Controls 
Each item pair’s early and late scenario were used as controls for one another.  After this 
process, regressions were used to see if there was a statistically significant correlation between 
the results and the movie title, the time of the auction, the seller’s feedback rating, whether the 
items were old or new, what the composition of the set was in terms of old and new items, the 
amount of time between sets, and whether the item contained a shipping price, tax, or was sold in 
an eBay store. 
 
4. Results 
 
When shipping prices were excluded, the mean in the late condition was $.016 greater than that 
of the early condition.  When they were included, the mean in the late condition was $.0035 less 
than that of the early condition.  Neither of these relationships was statistically significant, 
indicating that there is no price effect. 
 
When shipping prices were excluded, the mean chance of winning at the 25th percentile or less in 
the late condition was .0019 lower than that of the early condition.  When they were included, 
the mean chance of winning at the 25th percentile or less in the late condition was .0024 lower 
than that of the early condition.  Neither of these relationships was statistically significant, 
indicating that there is no frequency effect. 
 
The statistical analysis of these effects is included in Appendix A.  The effects were so small 
because most of the prices of the items did not change between 2 days and 2 minutes before the 
auctions ended. 
 
5. Limitations 
 
Of the 4,238 items, 2,926 (69.04%) items had the same price 2 minutes and 2 days before the 
auction ended.  914 (21.57%) items had greater prices 2 minutes before the auction ended and 
398 (9.39%) had greater prices 2 days before the auction ended.  9.39% is quite a large number 
of items with prices heading in the downward direction as time goes on and it suggests that there 
may be some flaws in the data.   
 
In addition, 27.54% of the bids were removed but the rest of the bids on any item were allowed 
to remain, so items were still included in the study even though their bidding history might have 
been altered.  This may have resulted in inaccuracies in the pricing model. 
 
Finally, sets were selected at random and controls were added later through a regression.  
Although the control regressions demonstrate that most of the control variables did not have any 
relationship with the difference between prices of items chosen in the early and late condition or 
the chance of the price being in the 25th percentile or less, there were some variables that were 
significant (See Appendix B).  Note that, while some variables were significant in these 
regressions, the R square values were extremely low, between .02 and .05, because the vast 
majority of items had no difference across the early and late condition. 
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The difference in the seller’s feedback rating when compared to the average of the two ratings in 
a pair had a statistically significant slightly positive impact on the difference between the chance 
of winning at a price at or lower than the 25th percentile price (including shipping) in the early 
and late condition.  This effect was slightly positive. 
 
The movie title had a statistically significant effect on everything (including and excluding 
shipping prices), with different titles working in both directions.   
 
In order to test the reason for this significance, the correlations of the individual regression 
coefficients for each movie title with the average price of that movie, standard deviation in that 
movie’s price distribution, and number of items available for that movie title were examined.  
This was to explore the direction of any possible relationship between those variables and the 
regression coefficients. 
 
Further, new simple linear regressions were run to map these variables on the p-values of those 
original regression coefficients.  This was to test if the variable had a statistically significant 
relationship with the statistical significance of the regression coefficients.  The correlation 
examined what the relationship was between each variable and the regression coefficient, while 
these regressions determined if that relationship mattered.   
 
Finally, the coefficients of these latter regressions were used to examine how these variables 
were related to the significance of the movie coefficient.  The coefficient here assessed in what 
way the variable impacted the statistical significance of the discrepancies whereas the coefficient 
from the original regression assessed in what way it impacted the actual values. 
 
The results of this analysis are summarized in Appendix C.  There was only one relationship that 
was almost statistically significant – the standard deviation of a movie’s price distribution had a 
negative impact on the chance of winning at the 25th percentile price or less.  The standard 
deviation of the movie’s price distribution had a p-value of .057 if shipping prices were 
excluded, and .074 if they were included. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
This study found no economic benefits to late bidding.  By controlling for each pair of items 
against themselves, and incorporating data on the hidden proxy bids to determine exactly how 
much a bidder would have to pay to win an item, this finding appears to be more robust than 
some of the other literature.  However, the study’s limitations may warrant further exploration 
with another historical dataset. 
 
Despite the limitations to this study, there are some important insights that can be drawn from its 
analysis of item histories.  First, the majority of items had the same prices 2 days and 2 minutes 
before the auction’s close.  This is important because it implies that waiting may not increase the 
amount of information available about the item’s closing price. 
 
Another interesting effect in this study was the fact that movie titles did make a difference, and 
this difference was not related to the average price.  This suggests that differences in consumer 
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tastes may be related to the manner in which they place bids, making late bidding an optimal 
strategy for some titles.   
 
Although this finding was not significant, the fact that the standard deviation of movie prices had 
a negative impact on the chance of winning the title for a price at or lower than the 25th 
percentile is surprising because intuitively a larger spread might increase one’s chances. 
 
7. Future Research 
 
Future research could examine larger sets of items and a more extreme time interval for early 
bidding (2 days was chosen in this study because some auctions only have a duration of 3 days).  
Further analyses were not conducted in this study because an endogenous ending rule was 
developed before the research began to protect against the follies of data mining. 
 
So far research has demonstrated that there is no economic benefit to sniping, and this study is 
consistent with the literature.  However, one possible flaw in the research is the need for 
controls, a need which forces researchers to ignore non-commoditized products.  Future research 
may be able to tackle this problem with a carefully constructed simulation experiment which 
forces artificial budget constraints and utility functions onto a community of people bidding on 
one-of-a-kind items.  The person who maximizes his utility (as defined by the experiment) would 
win a monetary prize.  This type of experiment may reveal economic benefits to late bidding. 
 
Another facet of late bidding worthy of future research is the real economic cost of lock-in.  By 
bidding early, bidders are locked into a contract which they do not know they will win.  A study 
examining the relationship between time pressure in making a purchase decision and the amount 
of late bidding could demonstrate a time effect which may help explain late bidding. 
 
Finally, there might be a number of psychological effects that contribute to the abundance of late 
bidding.  In the future, it might be useful to measure utility instead of dollars when exploring the 
benefits of late bidding.
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9. Appendix A: T Tests for Differences Between Means in Early and Late Conditions 
 
T Tests 
T Test 
Mean1 
(Late) 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 
Mean2 
(Early) 
Standard 
Deviation 
2 
Difference 
Between 
Means 
(Late-
Early) DF T Stat 
P Value 
(One-
Sided) 
P 
Value 
(Two-
Sided) 
Prices in 
Early and 
Late 
Conditions 
(Excluding 
Shipping) 11.31851 2.9421388 11.3025 2.9702997 0.01603587 4237 0.2497 0.40142 0.8028 
Prices in 
Early and 
Late 
Conditions 
(Including 
Shipping) 13.9567 3.4052137 13.9602 3.4355638 -0.0035064 4237 -0.047 0.48118 0.9624 
Chance of 
Winning in 
25th 
Percentile in 
Early and 
Late 
Condition 
(Excluding 
Shipping) 0.026899 0.1618088 0.02879 0.1672276 -0.0018877 4237 -0.528 0.29873 0.5975 
Chance of 
Winning in 
25th 
Percentile in 
Early and 
Late 
Condition 
(Including 
Shipping) 0.032091 0.1762615 0.03445 0.1824041 -0.0023596 4237 -0.606 0.27241 0.5448 
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10. Appendix B: Statistical Analysis to Control for Effects of Other Variables 
 
Note: All prices are the prices it would take to win the auction chosen in the set.  Each set has 2 
data points, one for each item in the set (and each item has some unique characteristics). 
 
Response Variable: Price Difference Between Early 
and Late Condition (Excluding Shipping Price ) 
Summary of Fit 
  
RSquare 0.022971
RSquare Adj 0.007958
Root Mean Square Error 1.168153
Mean of Response 0.013485
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 4230
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 64 133.6243 2.08788 1.5301
Error 4165 5683.4781 1.36458 Prob > F
C. Total 4229 5817.1024 0.0044
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Lack Of Fit 4153 5683.4525 1.36852 641.4925
Pure Error 12 0.0256 0.00213 Prob > F
Total Error 4165 5683.4781 <.0001
  Max RSq
  1.0000
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept  0.1740201 0.129869 1.34 0.1803 
Mov[15 Minutes]  0.0024428 0.309804 0.01 0.9937 
Mov[40 Days and 4]  0.0965037 0.106274 0.91 0.3639 
Mov[A Knight Ta]  -0.709959 0.408886 -1.74 0.0826 
Mov[Along Came]  -0.012337 0.273908 -0.05 0.9641 
Mov[Americas Sw]  0.0551485 0.157562 0.35 0.7263 
Mov[Angel Eyes]  -0.111922 0.47439 -0.24 0.8135 
Mov[Big Fat Liar]  0.0389656 0.109168 0.36 0.7212 
Mov[Blade 2]  0.0577103 0.119484 0.48 0.6291 
Mov[Blow]  -0.008294 0.220777 -0.04 0.9700 
Mov[Boiler Room]  -0.934392 0.470972 -1.98 0.0473 
Mov[Bridget Jon]  0.5100302 0.365267 1.40 0.1627 
Mov[Cast Away]  0.0549663 0.191938 0.29 0.7746 
Mov[Changing Lane]  -0.046599 0.098858 -0.47 0.6374 
Mov[Count of Mont]  0.1875203 0.095437 1.96 0.0495 
Mov[Evolution]  0.0015737 0.813742 0.00 0.9985 
Mov[Fight Club]  0.3482919 0.260096 1.34 0.1806 
Mov[Frailty]  -0.030207 0.408838 -0.07 0.9411 
Mov[Grease]  -0.046991 0.151063 -0.31 0.7558 
Mov[Hard Day's Ni]  0.3485895 0.290324 1.20 0.2299 
Mov[Heartbreake]  0.0767483 0.575343 0.13 0.8939 
Mov[High Crimes]  0.053435 0.129528 0.41 0.6800 
Mov[How the Gri]  0.2848356 0.207129 1.38 0.1692 
Mov[Independenc]  0.0402731 0.309883 0.13 0.8966 
Mov[Jurassic Pa]  0.061672 0.290382 0.21 0.8318 
Mov[Lara Croft:]  0.1328232 0.178463 0.74 0.4568 
Mov[Lord of the R]  0.0177946 0.063542 0.28 0.7795 
Mov[Memento]  0.338778 0.187638 1.81 0.0711 
Mov[Monsters inc.]  0.0957052 0.072429 1.32 0.1865 
Mov[Moulin Roug]  -0.02692 0.365501 -0.07 0.9413 
Mov[Murder by Num]  0.0461485 0.274453 0.17 0.8665 
Mov[O Brother]  0.2405006 0.290218 0.83 0.4073 
Mov[Panic Room]  0.0228009 0.080443 0.28 0.7769 
12 
Term   Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Mov[Pearl Harbo]  0.1449198 0.119323 1.21 0.2246 
Mov[Planet of t]  0.2883771 0.121138 2.38 0.0173 
Mov[Pulp Fiction]  0.0027967 0.111888 0.02 0.9801 
Mov[Reservoir Dog]  -0.576749 0.138632 -4.16 <.0001 
Mov[Rookie]  0.0626791 0.07479 0.84 0.4020 
Mov[Rush Hour 2]  -0.07445 0.1819 -0.41 0.6823 
Mov[Scary Movie]  -0.793773 0.248781 -3.19 0.0014 
Mov[Scream 3]  -0.039679 0.575938 -0.07 0.9451 
Mov[Shrek]  0.5852858 0.156333 3.74 0.0002 
Mov[Swordfish]  0.0366721 0.238216 0.15 0.8777 
Mov[The Family]  -0.061082 0.334306 -0.18 0.8550 
Mov[The Green M]  -0.215903 0.207045 -1.04 0.2971 
Mov[The Hurrica]  0.0253753 0.813408 0.03 0.9751 
Mov[The Matrix]  -0.051717 0.16785 -0.31 0.7580 
Mov[The Mexican]  -0.01429 0.248131 -0.06 0.9541 
Mov[The Mummy R]  -0.312298 0.229577 -1.36 0.1738 
Mov[The Princes]  0.0329551 0.260593 0.13 0.8994 
Mov[The Score]  -0.189537 0.366324 -0.52 0.6049 
Mov[The Sixth S]  -0.084562 0.174533 -0.48 0.6281 
Mov[True Romance]  0.0508576 0.174649 0.29 0.7709 
Mov[Van Wilder (u]  -0.089926 0.169112 -0.53 0.5949 
Set Type[Mix]  -0.012126 0.02669 -0.45 0.6496 
Set Type[New]  -0.038173 0.043466 -0.88 0.3799 
New?[0]  0.0030694 0.03083 0.10 0.9207 
Store?[0]  -0.000704 0.045026 -0.02 0.9875 
Ship?[0]  -0.022094 0.021819 -1.01 0.3113 
Tax?[0]  -0.091575 0.047945 -1.91 0.0562 
Min Til 11/30  -0.000002 0.000001 -1.24 0.2162 
Min Apart  -0.001261 0.00052 -2.42 0.0154 
Seller Rating  0.0000025 0.000009 0.27 0.7863 
Seller Rating Difference  -0.000003 0.000008 -0.33 0.7446 
Seller Rating Difference / Avg  0.1195031 0.066266 1.80 0.0714 
 
Effect Tests 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F   
Mov 53 53 108.70740 1.5031 0.0109  
Set Type 2 2 1.75931 0.6446 0.5249  
New? 1 1 0.01353 0.0099 0.9207  
Store? 1 1 0.00033 0.0002 0.9875  
Ship? 1 1 1.39927 1.0254 0.3113  
Tax? 1 1 4.97817 3.6481 0.0562  
Min Til 11/30 1 1 2.08756 1.5298 0.2162  
Min Apart 1 1 8.01278 5.8720 0.0154  
Seller Rating 1 1 0.10027 0.0735 0.7863  
Seller Rating Difference 1 1 0.14487 0.1062 0.7446  
Seller Rating Difference / Avg 1 1 4.43785 3.2522 0.0714  
 
13 
Response Variable: Price Difference Between Early 
and Late Condition (Including Shipping Price Where 
Available) 
Summary of Fit 
  
RSquare 0.02747
RSquare Adj 0.012526
Root Mean Square Error 1.545301
Mean of Response -0.00609
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 4230
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 64 280.930 4.38953 1.8382
Error 4165 9945.831 2.38795 Prob > F
C. Total 4229 10226.760 <.0001
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Lack Of Fit 4153 9894.5649 2.38251 0.5577
Pure Error 12 51.2656 4.27213 Prob > F
Total Error 4165 9945.8305 0.9563
  Max RSq
  0.9950
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept  0.0801492 0.171798 0.47 0.6409 
Mov[15 Minutes]  0.0054201 0.409827 0.01 0.9894 
Mov[40 Days and 4]  0.0398859 0.140585 0.28 0.7766 
Mov[A Knight Ta]  -2.632842 0.540898 -4.87 <.0001 
Mov[Along Came]  -0.019732 0.362341 -0.05 0.9566 
Mov[Americas Sw]  0.04908 0.208433 0.24 0.8139 
Mov[Angel Eyes]  -0.178649 0.627551 -0.28 0.7759 
Mov[Big Fat Liar]  0.0614237 0.144414 0.43 0.6706 
Mov[Blade 2]  -0.094363 0.15806 -0.60 0.5505 
Mov[Blow]  -0.020924 0.292056 -0.07 0.9429 
Mov[Boiler Room]  0.713306 0.62303 1.14 0.2523 
Mov[Bridget Jon]  1.4881128 0.483197 3.08 0.0021 
Mov[Cast Away]  0.0623394 0.253906 0.25 0.8061 
Mov[Changing Lane]  0.0280162 0.130775 0.21 0.8304 
Mov[Count of Mont]  0.1740014 0.12625 1.38 0.1682 
Mov[Evolution]  0.0332528 1.076465 0.03 0.9754 
Mov[Fight Club]  0.3523844 0.34407 1.02 0.3058 
Mov[Frailty]  -0.080872 0.540835 -0.15 0.8811 
Mov[Grease]  -0.130902 0.199835 -0.66 0.5125 
Mov[Hard Day's Ni]  -0.03782 0.384058 -0.10 0.9216 
Mov[Heartbreake]  0.0387909 0.761097 0.05 0.9594 
Mov[High Crimes]  0.0584435 0.171348 0.34 0.7331 
Mov[How the Gri]  0.3272417 0.274002 1.19 0.2324 
Mov[Independenc]  0.0527668 0.409932 0.13 0.8976 
Mov[Jurassic Pa]  -0.008987 0.384135 -0.02 0.9813 
Mov[Lara Croft:]  -0.228348 0.236081 -0.97 0.3335 
Mov[Lord of the R]  -0.000242 0.084057 -0.00 0.9977 
Mov[Memento]  0.7832267 0.248218 3.16 0.0016 
Mov[Monsters inc.]  0.0009293 0.095814 0.01 0.9923 
Mov[Moulin Roug]  0.6793915 0.483507 1.41 0.1601 
Mov[Murder by Num]  0.0537391 0.363062 0.15 0.8823 
Mov[O Brother]  0.4212972 0.383917 1.10 0.2725 
Mov[Panic Room]  -0.0026 0.106415 -0.02 0.9805 
Mov[Pearl Harbo]  0.2848505 0.157847 1.80 0.0712 
Mov[Planet of t]  0.4339924 0.160248 2.71 0.0068 
Mov[Pulp Fiction]  0.0529601 0.148012 0.36 0.7205 
Mov[Reservoir Dog]  -0.504104 0.183391 -2.75 0.0060 
Mov[Rookie]  0.0050671 0.098937 0.05 0.9592 
14 
Term   Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Mov[Rush Hour 2]  -0.412009 0.240628 -1.71 0.0869 
Mov[Scary Movie]  -1.1912 0.329101 -3.62 0.0003 
Mov[Scream 3]  -0.082492 0.761885 -0.11 0.9138 
Mov[Shrek]  0.5786282 0.206806 2.80 0.0052 
Mov[Swordfish]  0.0339672 0.315126 0.11 0.9142 
Mov[The Family]  -0.093319 0.442239 -0.21 0.8329 
Mov[The Green M]  -0.380967 0.273892 -1.39 0.1643 
Mov[The Hurrica]  -0.019261 1.076024 -0.02 0.9857 
Mov[The Matrix]  0.1377785 0.222042 0.62 0.5350 
Mov[The Mexican]  -0.027806 0.328242 -0.08 0.9325 
Mov[The Mummy R]  -0.338819 0.303697 -1.12 0.2646 
Mov[The Princes]  -0.013691 0.344728 -0.04 0.9683 
Mov[The Score]  -0.110351 0.484595 -0.23 0.8199 
Mov[The Sixth S]  -0.268184 0.230882 -1.16 0.2455 
Mov[True Romance]  -0.080064 0.231036 -0.35 0.7290 
Mov[Van Wilder (u]  -0.059095 0.223712 -0.26 0.7917 
Set Type[Mix]  -0.032901 0.035307 -0.93 0.3515 
Set Type[New]  -0.050869 0.057499 -0.88 0.3764 
New?[0]  0.0052903 0.040784 0.13 0.8968 
Store?[0]  -0.025608 0.059563 -0.43 0.6673 
Ship?[0]  -0.040178 0.028863 -1.39 0.1640 
Tax?[0]  -0.11367 0.063424 -1.79 0.0732 
Min Til 11/30  1.9061e-7 0.000002 0.10 0.9192 
Min Apart  -0.001029 0.000688 -1.50 0.1350 
Seller Rating  -9.9e-7 0.000012 -0.08 0.9356 
Seller Rating Difference  0.0000012 0.000011 0.11 0.9144 
Seller Rating Difference / Avg  0.1008505 0.087661 1.15 0.2500 
 
Effect Tests 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F   
Mov 53 53 246.52796 1.9479 <.0001  
Set Type 2 2 5.40964 1.1327 0.3223  
New? 1 1 0.04018 0.0168 0.8968  
Store? 1 1 0.44139 0.1848 0.6673  
Ship? 1 1 4.62718 1.9377 0.1640  
Tax? 1 1 7.67018 3.2120 0.0732  
Min Til 11/30 1 1 0.02456 0.0103 0.9192  
Min Apart 1 1 5.33771 2.2353 0.1350  
Seller Rating 1 1 0.01561 0.0065 0.9356  
Seller Rating Difference 1 1 0.02759 0.0116 0.9144  
Seller Rating Difference / Avg 1 1 3.16060 1.3236 0.2500  
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Response Variable: 25th Percentile Bid in Late 
Condition – 25th Percentile in Early Condition 
(Excluding Shipping Price) 
 
Summary of Fit 
  
RSquare 0.037541
RSquare Adj 0.022752
Root Mean Square Error 0.060777
Mean of Response -0.00189
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 4230
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 64 0.600086 0.009376 2.5384
Error 4165 15.384784 0.003694 Prob > F
C. Total 4229 15.984870 <.0001
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Lack Of Fit 4153 15.384784 0.003704 .
Pure Error 12 0.000000 0.000000 Prob > F
Total Error 4165 15.384784 .
  Max RSq
  1.0000
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept  -0.002526 0.006757 -0.37 0.7086 
Mov[15 Minutes]  0.0040711 0.016119 0.25 0.8006 
Mov[40 Days and 4]  0.0000233 0.005529 0.00 0.9966 
Mov[A Knight Ta]  -0.003578 0.021274 -0.17 0.8664 
Mov[Along Came]  -0.000679 0.014251 -0.05 0.9620 
Mov[Americas Sw]  -0.000414 0.008198 -0.05 0.9597 
Mov[Angel Eyes]  0.0055285 0.024682 0.22 0.8228 
Mov[Big Fat Liar]  -0.003927 0.00568 -0.69 0.4893 
Mov[Blade 2]  0.0006725 0.006217 0.11 0.9139 
Mov[Blow]  0.0019051 0.011487 0.17 0.8683 
Mov[Boiler Room]  -0.000673 0.024504 -0.03 0.9781 
Mov[Bridget Jon]  -0.000169 0.019004 -0.01 0.9929 
Mov[Cast Away]  0.0022097 0.009986 0.22 0.8249 
Mov[Changing Lane]  -0.001848 0.005143 -0.36 0.7193 
Mov[Count of Mont]  -0.01133 0.004965 -2.28 0.0225 
Mov[Evolution]  0.0089693 0.042337 0.21 0.8322 
Mov[Fight Club]  0.000957 0.013532 0.07 0.9436 
Mov[Frailty]  0.0061864 0.021271 0.29 0.7712 
Mov[Grease]  -0.00086 0.00786 -0.11 0.9129 
Mov[Hard Day's Ni]  -0.00268 0.015105 -0.18 0.8592 
Mov[Heartbreake]  -0.000321 0.029934 -0.01 0.9915 
Mov[High Crimes]  -0.000265 0.006739 -0.04 0.9687 
Mov[How the Gri]  -0.063242 0.010777 -5.87 <.0001 
Mov[Independenc]  -0.000943 0.016123 -0.06 0.9534 
Mov[Jurassic Pa]  0.0002258 0.015108 0.01 0.9881 
Mov[Lara Croft:]  0.004514 0.009285 0.49 0.6269 
Mov[Lord of the R]  -0.000445 0.003306 -0.13 0.8928 
Mov[Memento]  0.0484363 0.009762 4.96 <.0001 
Mov[Monsters inc.]  -0.00272 0.003768 -0.72 0.4705 
Mov[Moulin Roug]  0.0038774 0.019016 0.20 0.8384 
Mov[Murder by Num]  -0.000133 0.014279 -0.01 0.9926 
Mov[O Brother]  0.0019392 0.0151 0.13 0.8978 
Mov[Panic Room]  -0.002146 0.004185 -0.51 0.6082 
Mov[Pearl Harbo]  -0.016899 0.006208 -2.72 0.0065 
Mov[Planet of t]  -0.01792 0.006303 -2.84 0.0045 
Mov[Pulp Fiction]  0.0008166 0.005821 0.14 0.8885 
Mov[Reservoir Dog]  0.0000239 0.007213 0.00 0.9974 
16 
Term   Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Mov[Rookie]  -0.002375 0.003891 -0.61 0.5416 
Mov[Rush Hour 2]  0.0022688 0.009464 0.24 0.8105 
Mov[Scary Movie]  0.0025873 0.012944 0.20 0.8416 
Mov[Scream 3]  0.0059473 0.029965 0.20 0.8427 
Mov[Shrek]  -0.033486 0.008134 -4.12 <.0001 
Mov[Swordfish]  0.000698 0.012394 0.06 0.9551 
Mov[The Family]  0.0045575 0.017393 0.26 0.7933 
Mov[The Green M]  0.0035815 0.010772 0.33 0.7395 
Mov[The Hurrica]  0.0008843 0.04232 0.02 0.9833 
Mov[The Matrix]  0.0403147 0.008733 4.62 <.0001 
Mov[The Mexican]  0.0030214 0.01291 0.23 0.8150 
Mov[The Mummy R]  0.0028421 0.011944 0.24 0.8119 
Mov[The Princes]  0.0008481 0.013558 0.06 0.9501 
Mov[The Score]  0.0097808 0.019059 0.51 0.6079 
Mov[The Sixth S]  0.0026285 0.009081 0.29 0.7722 
Mov[True Romance]  0.0026656 0.009087 0.29 0.7693 
Mov[Van Wilder (u]  0.0017883 0.008799 0.20 0.8390 
Set Type[Mix]  0.0036414 0.001389 2.62 0.0088 
Set Type[New]  0.0034955 0.002261 1.55 0.1223 
Seller Rating  -8.322e-8 4.816e-7 -0.17 0.8628 
Seller Rating Difference  -1.864e-7 4.29e-7 -0.43 0.6640 
Seller Rating Difference / Avg  0.0029788 0.003448 0.86 0.3876 
New?[0]  -0.000267 0.001604 -0.17 0.8676 
Store?[0]  -0.004451 0.002343 -1.90 0.0575 
Ship?[0]  0.002181 0.001135 1.92 0.0548 
Tax?[0]  -0.001789 0.002494 -0.72 0.4733 
Min Til 11/30  7.7482e-8 7.392e-8 1.05 0.2946 
Min Apart  0.0000527 0.000027 1.95 0.0517 
 
Effect Tests 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F   
Mov 53 53 0.45913964 2.3453 <.0001  
Set Type 2 2 0.04571973 6.1887 0.0021  
Seller Rating 1 1 0.00011030 0.0299 0.8628  
Seller Rating Difference 1 1 0.00069705 0.1887 0.6640  
Seller Rating Difference / Avg 1 1 0.00275742 0.7465 0.3876  
New? 1 1 0.00010269 0.0278 0.8676  
Store? 1 1 0.01333303 3.6095 0.0575  
Ship? 1 1 0.01363438 3.6911 0.0548  
Tax? 1 1 0.00190035 0.5145 0.4733  
Min Til 11/30 1 1 0.00405837 1.0987 0.2946  
Min Apart 1 1 0.01399628 3.7891 0.0517  
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Response Variable: 25th Percentile Bid in Late 
Condition – 25th Percentile in Early Condition 
(Including Shipping Price Where Available) 
 
Summary of Fit 
  
RSquare 0.045894
RSquare Adj 0.031233
Root Mean Square Error 0.07714
Mean of Response -0.00236
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 4230
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 64 1.192153 0.018627 3.1303
Error 4165 24.784207 0.005951 Prob > F
C. Total 4229 25.976359 <.0001
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Lack Of Fit 4153 24.784207 0.005968 .
Pure Error 12 0.000000 0.000000 Prob > F
Total Error 4165 24.784207 .
  Max RSq
  1.0000
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept  -0.00998 0.008576 -1.16 0.2446 
Mov[15 Minutes]  0.0058041 0.020458 0.28 0.7766 
Mov[40 Days and 4]  0.0018372 0.007018 0.26 0.7935 
Mov[A Knight Ta]  -0.005164 0.027001 -0.19 0.8483 
Mov[Along Came]  -0.001602 0.018088 -0.09 0.9294 
Mov[Americas Sw]  0.0022264 0.010405 0.21 0.8306 
Mov[Angel Eyes]  0.0067205 0.031327 0.21 0.8301 
Mov[Big Fat Liar]  -0.000523 0.007209 -0.07 0.9422 
Mov[Blade 2]  0.0203126 0.00789 2.57 0.0101 
Mov[Blow]  0.0009244 0.014579 0.06 0.9494 
Mov[Boiler Room]  0.0020881 0.031101 0.07 0.9465 
Mov[Bridget Jon]  -0.001311 0.024121 -0.05 0.9567 
Mov[Cast Away]  0.0038295 0.012675 0.30 0.7626 
Mov[Changing Lane]  0.0008755 0.006528 0.13 0.8933 
Mov[Count of Mont]  -0.008545 0.006302 -1.36 0.1752 
Mov[Evolution]  0.0110975 0.053736 0.21 0.8364 
Mov[Fight Club]  0.0015237 0.017176 0.09 0.9293 
Mov[Frailty]  0.0027392 0.026998 0.10 0.9192 
Mov[Grease]  0.001043 0.009976 0.10 0.9167 
Mov[Hard Day's Ni]  -0.000022 0.019172 -0.00 0.9991 
Mov[Heartbreake]  0.0029864 0.037993 0.08 0.9374 
Mov[High Crimes]  0.0017045 0.008554 0.20 0.8421 
Mov[How the Gri]  -0.124637 0.013678 -9.11 <.0001 
Mov[Independenc]  0.0027701 0.020463 0.14 0.8923 
Mov[Jurassic Pa]  0.0002086 0.019176 0.01 0.9913 
Mov[Lara Croft:]  0.0034854 0.011785 0.30 0.7674 
Mov[Lord of the R]  0.0004061 0.004196 0.10 0.9229 
Mov[Memento]  -0.000562 0.012391 -0.05 0.9639 
Mov[Monsters inc.]  -0.001005 0.004783 -0.21 0.8336 
Mov[Moulin Roug]  0.0045675 0.024136 0.19 0.8499 
Mov[Murder by Num]  0.0006918 0.018124 0.04 0.9696 
Mov[O Brother]  0.0020104 0.019165 0.10 0.9165 
Mov[Panic Room]  0.000327 0.005312 0.06 0.9509 
Mov[Pearl Harbo]  -0.016033 0.00788 -2.03 0.0419 
Mov[Planet of t]  -0.036219 0.007999 -4.53 <.0001 
Mov[Pulp Fiction]  0.0012567 0.007389 0.17 0.8650 
18 
Term   Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Mov[Reservoir Dog]  -0.02457 0.009155 -2.68 0.0073 
Mov[Rookie]  0.0002968 0.004939 0.06 0.9521 
Mov[Rush Hour 2]  0.0027 0.012012 0.22 0.8222 
Mov[Scary Movie]  0.0922441 0.016428 5.61 <.0001 
Mov[Scream 3]  0.0012138 0.038033 0.03 0.9745 
Mov[Shrek]  -0.033043 0.010324 -3.20 0.0014 
Mov[Swordfish]  0.0020536 0.015731 0.13 0.8961 
Mov[The Family]  0.0028672 0.022076 0.13 0.8967 
Mov[The Green M]  0.003465 0.013672 0.25 0.7999 
Mov[The Hurrica]  -0.001419 0.053714 -0.03 0.9789 
Mov[The Matrix]  0.0414021 0.011084 3.74 0.0002 
Mov[The Mexican]  0.0032496 0.016386 0.20 0.8428 
Mov[The Mummy R]  0.0055059 0.01516 0.36 0.7165 
Mov[The Princes]  0.0026251 0.017209 0.15 0.8788 
Mov[The Score]  0.0064331 0.024191 0.27 0.7903 
Mov[The Sixth S]  0.0029669 0.011525 0.26 0.7969 
Mov[True Romance]  0.0028375 0.011533 0.25 0.8057 
Mov[Van Wilder (u]  0.0019489 0.011168 0.17 0.8615 
Set Type[Mix]  0.0012204 0.001763 0.69 0.4887 
Set Type[New]  0.0035069 0.00287 1.22 0.2219 
Seller Rating  1.4412e-7 6.113e-7 0.24 0.8136 
Seller Rating Difference  -2.032e-7 5.445e-7 -0.37 0.7090 
Seller Rating Difference / Avg  0.0100845 0.004376 2.30 0.0212 
New?[0]  -0.000197 0.002036 -0.10 0.9228 
Store?[0]  -0.001318 0.002973 -0.44 0.6576 
Ship?[0]  0.0014706 0.001441 1.02 0.3075 
Tax?[0]  -0.000612 0.003166 -0.19 0.8467 
Min Til 11/30  1.1458e-7 9.382e-8 1.22 0.2221 
Min Apart  -0.000026 0.000034 -0.75 0.4534 
 
Effect Tests 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F   
Mov 53 53 1.0952515 3.4728 <.0001  
Set Type 2 2 0.0156195 1.3124 0.2693  
Seller Rating 1 1 0.0003308 0.0556 0.8136  
Seller Rating Difference 1 1 0.0008287 0.1393 0.7090  
Seller Rating Difference / Avg 1 1 0.0316027 5.3108 0.0212  
New? 1 1 0.0000559 0.0094 0.9228  
Store? 1 1 0.0011692 0.1965 0.6576  
Ship? 1 1 0.0061990 1.0417 0.3075  
Tax? 1 1 0.0002223 0.0374 0.8467  
Min Til 11/30 1 1 0.0088752 1.4915 0.2221  
Min Apart 1 1 0.0033458 0.5623 0.4534  
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11. Appendix C: Statistical Analysis to See How Movie Variables Impact the Movie 
Regression Coefficients 
 
Response Variable: P Value for Individual Movie Coefficients in Regression for Difference in 
Absolute Prices (Excluding Shipping) 
Movie Attributes 
Correlation Between 
Variable and Original 
Regression Coefficients 
P Value for 
Regression of 
P Value 
Coefficient of 
Regression of 
P Value 
Average Price Excluding 
Shipping 0.227142347 0.070182779 -0.043002764 
Standard Deviation of Prices 
Excluding Shipping 0.12878064 0.691222831 -0.024944453 
Number of Items 0.126989498 0.307059251 -0.000351636 
    
    
Response Variable: P Value for Individual Movie Coefficients in Regression for  Difference in 
Absolute Prices (Including Shipping) 
Movie Attributes 
Correlation Between 
Variable and Original 
Regression Coefficients 
P Value for 
Regression of 
P Value 
Coefficient of 
Regression of 
P Value 
Average Price Including Shipping 0.151683232 0.562707351 -0.014532537 
Standard Deviation of Prices 
Including Shipping 0.076992554 0.100322405 -0.120686992 
Number of Items 0.039357722 0.227452994 0.00044721 
    
    
Response Variable: P Value for Individual Movie Coefficients in Regression for  Difference in 
Bidding at 25th Percentile or Less (Excluding Shipping) 
Movie Attributes 
Correlation Between 
Variable and Original 
Regression Coefficients 
P Value for 
Regression of 
P Value 
Coefficient of 
Regression of 
P Value 
Average Price Excluding 
Shipping -0.034418532 0.635489095 -0.01042958 
Standard Deviation of Prices 
Excluding Shipping 0.130029667 0.056818872 -0.10731582 
Number of Items -0.130355694 0.115280007 -0.000491318 
    
    
Response Variable: P Value for Individual Movie Coefficients in Regression for  Difference in 
Bidding at 25th Percentile or Less (Including Shipping) 
Movie Attributes 
Correlation Between 
Variable and Original 
Regression Coefficients 
P Value for 
Regression of 
P Value 
Coefficient of 
Regression of 
P Value 
Average Price Including Shipping -0.007183173 0.959287317 -0.001149912 
Standard Deviation of Prices 
Including Shipping -0.247533312 0.073933673 -0.117273865 
Number of Items -0.053346831 0.704405448 -0.000126734 
 
20 
